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Indigenous peopleConditional cash transfer (CCT) programs to increase primary-school enrollment and attendance among
low-income households have been shown to benefit children and households, but to date little is known
about who joins such programs. We test three hypotheses about predictors of CCT program participation
in indigenous societies in Bolivia, focusing on attributes of the household (ethnicity), parents (modern
human capital), and children (age, sex). We model whether children receive a transfer from Bolivia’s
CCT program (Bono Juancito Pinto), using data from 811 school-age children and nine ethnic groups.
Children from the group least exposed to Westerners (Tsimane’) are 18–22 percentage points less likely
to participate in the program than children from other lowland ethnic groups. Parental modern human
capital and child sex do not predict participation. We discuss possible mechanisms underlying the find-
ings and conclude that the Tsimane’s current lower returns to schooling are the most likely explanation.
 2017 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
Since their first implementation in Brazil and Mexico in 1997,
conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs to increase primary
school enrollment and attendance among children from low-
income households have spread widely in Latin America
(Behrman, Parker, & Todd, 2011; Handa & Davis, 2006; Lomeli,
2008; Nagels, 2016) and beyond (Behrman, 2010; Fiszbein &
Schady, 2009; Saavedra & García, 2013). In most CCT programs,
parents or children receive cash payments if the child attends
school for a minimum of about 80–85% of school days (Fiszbein
& Schady, 2009, p. 86). Evaluations of CCT programs show that they
have met their goals of increasing school enrollment and atten-
dance (Baird, Ferreira, Özler, & Woolcock, 2014; Behrman,
Sengupta, & Todd, 2005; Benedetti, Ibarrarán, & McEwan, 2016;
Fiszbein & Schady, 2009; Ganimian & Murnane, 2016; Schultz,
2004; Todd & Wolpin, 2006), but also show that their effects onacademic and cognitive skills remain unclear (Baird, McIntosh, &
Özler, 2011; Ganimian & Murnane, 2016; McEwan, 2015).
Despite the voluminous literature on the impacts of CCT pro-
grams in Latin America, little is known about their impacts among
indigenous peoples, who are among the poorest in the continent
(Hall & Patrinos, 2012; Van de gaer, Vandenbossche, & Figueroa,
2013). The few published impact evaluations of CCT programs
among indigenous peoples come from Mexico’s CCT programs,
and show that the programs increased primary-school enrollment
and attendance (López-Calva & Patrinos, 2015) and some cognitive
skills (Figueroa, 2014), but failed to improve school drop-out
(Álvarez, Devoto, & Winters, 2008).
Even less is known about predictors of indigenous peoples’ par-
ticipation in CCT programs. Collateral evidence from evaluations of
such programs among disadvantaged groups suggests that children
from low-income households find it hard to access the programs
owing to the costs of compliance and transport to school, parental
misperceptions about the program, and low parental modern
human capital (i.e., literacy) (Cecchini & Madariaga, 2011; de
Janvry & Sadoulet, 2006; Lomeli, 2008; McGuire, 2013).
Indigenous peoples in Latin America on average underperform
in comparison with their non-indigenous peers in educational
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2012; Reimão & Tas, 2017; Valenzuela, 2004). In Bolivia, McEwan
(2004) estimates that primary school students from all indigenous
groups perform 0.3–0.5 standard deviations (SD) worse on
standardized tests of mathematics and Spanish than their non-
indigenous peers. Reimão and Tas (2017) used 2012 Bolivian
census data to estimate the gap in school achievement between
non-indigenous adults and adults from minority indigenous
groups (i.e. not Quechua and Aymara, the two largest indigenous
groups in Bolivia). They found that women and men from minority
indigenous groups completed 3.3 and 2.9 fewer grades of schooling
than their peers from non-indigenous groups. These trends hold in
our sample: children between seven and 16 years of age from the
most isolated groups (Tsimane’) completed 2.5 fewer years of
schooling than children from less isolated groups.
Since CCT programs to encourage primary-school enrollment
and attendance can produce both lasting effects on children and
spillover effects within the household (Behrman & Parker, 2013;
Behrman et al., 2011), and as indigenous peoples underperform
in educational attainment and are among the most marginalized
groups in Latin America, identifying the predictors of program par-
ticipation matters when designing better ways of reaching
marginalized indigenous peoples.
This article has three aims: (1) to characterize inter-ethnic and
intra-ethnic variation in participation in a CCT program for
primary-school enrollment and attendance in several native Ama-
zonian societies of Bolivia, (2) to test hypotheses about household,
parental, and child characteristics associated with participation in
such a program, and (3) to explore mechanisms that explain differ-
ences in participation. Like many other Latin American countries,
Bolivia started a CCT program to encourage primary-school atten-
dance. Known as Bono Juancito Pinto, the program since its incep-
tion in 2006 has paid annually US$28 per child attending grades
1–5, provided the child attends a public school and misses no more
than 20% of school days in the academic year. Children (or their
households) are eligible to receive transfers irrespective of house-
hold income, with payments made at the end of the school year for
qualifying children (McGuire, 2013). Since its beginning, the pro-
gram has expanded to cover up to the sixth (2007), eighth
(2008), ninth (2012), and twelfth (2014) grades (McGuire, 2013).
Unlike some other educational CCT programs, Bolivia’s CCT pro-
gram has not been evaluated with a randomized controlled trial.
National statistics suggest that the program’s impacts are mixed.
On the one hand, as the number of beneficiaries of the program
increased from 1.1 million in 2006 to 2.2 million in 2016
(Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas Públicas, 2016), national
enrollment rates have decreased. According to the latest data from
the Institute for Statistics of UNESCO, the net primary-school
enrollment rate in Bolivia declined every year from 96% when
the program started in 2006 to 89% in 2015, the last year for which
information was available (UNESCO, 2016). Aguilar Pacajes (2014)
shows that the decline in primary-school enrollment was sharper
in rural areas and in public schools than in cities or than in private
schools (the CCT program does not cover children enrolled in pri-
vate schools). On the other hand, rates of primary-school gradua-
tion have been increasing. The share of children completing
primary school has increased from 80% in 2006 to 97% in 2014,
and the proportion of children enrolled in the last year of primary
school who transition to secondary school has increased from 93%
in 2006 to 97% in 2014 (UNESCO, 2016). The share of children in
primary schools who continue their education has also increased
in rural areas, with girls outperforming boys, although rural areas
continue to lag behind urban areas (Aguilar Pacajes, 2014). To date,
little is known about how Bolivia’s CCT program for school enroll-
ment and attendance works among indigenous peoples.We analyze cross-sectional data on 811 children from multiple
ethnic groups in a rural area of lowland Bolivia and find that chil-
dren from the more-isolated, less-acculturated group (Tsimane’)
are less likely to receive a payment from the CCT program, and that
child age has a non-linear relation with the likelihood of receiving
the CCT payment. Children of about 11 years of age are most likely
to take part in the program. On the other hand, parental character-
istics, child sex, and school characteristics are not associated with
the likelihood that a child receives a payment. We examine several
possible explanations for the findings and conclude that the main
mechanism at work is the lower returns to modern schooling for
Tsimane’ households.
2. Hypotheses
The analysis centers on testing three hypotheses about predic-
tors of CCT program participation among indigenous people in
the Bolivian Amazon. The hypotheses focus on attributes of the
household (ethnicity), parents (modern human capital), and chil-
dren (age, sex) in grades  8.
H1 (Ethnic attributes). After controlling for household, child, and
school attributes, children from less-acculturated ethnic groups are
less likely to participate in the CCT program for primary-school
attendance than children from more-acculturated ethnic groups.We use the term acculturation as a synonym for degree of
incorporation into Western national society. Bolivian native Ama-
zonian societies vary in their mode of incorporation into national
society, from groups that historically avoided contact with out-
siders to groups that engaged with Westerners and Catholic mis-
sions as early as the sixteenth century (Godoy et al. 2015; 2005).
Our sample (described later) captures that range; it contains native
Amazonian societies with centuries of close contact with Jesuit
missions and ranchers (Moxeños), to cosmopolitan indigenous
people originally from the highlands, to groups like the Tsimane’
who have kept arm’s-length relations with Westerners. 83% of
the 24 villages studied included individuals of more than one eth-
nic group. Since our sample is mostly composed of ethnically-
mixed villages, we can test whether people from different ethnic
groups sharing the same village school and having the same access
to market towns vary in their propensity to take part in the educa-
tional CCT program.
H2 (Parental modern human capital). Children from households in
which parents have higher levels of modern human capital are more
likely to enroll in the CCT program.We equate modern human capital with school attainment and
with Spanish-speaking fluency. We expect to see a positive corre-
lation between (i) parental modern human capital and (ii) the
probability that children receive CCT payments. A national identi-
fication card makes it easier for children to receive the transfer,
since without it children would need two persons from the com-
munity vouching for their identity to receive the transfer
(McGuire, 2013). Since obtaining a national identification card
entails transaction costs (e.g., trips to towns) and the ability to deal
in Spanish with governmental officials, the requirement may act as
a filter for selecting children from households with more-schooled,
Spanish-speaking parents. The hypothesis also builds on findings
from other studies in Latin America that show that some eligible
households lack the resources to obtain the documentation to
access educational CCT programs (Feitosa de Britto, 2004) and from
studies in Bolivia showing that adult Spanish-speaking fluency
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(Chiswick, Patrinos, & Hurst, 2000; Godoy, Reyes-García et al.,
2007; Saidi, Behrman, Undurraga, & Godoy, 2016).
H3 (Child attributes). (a) There is no girl-boy disparity in participa-
tion in the CCT program. (b) Older children are more likely to enroll in
the CCT program than younger siblings.These hypotheses build on previous work among the Tsimane’.
(a) Previous research among the Tsimane’ suggests no girl-boy dif-
ference in school grades completed, academic skills, or in anthro-
pometric indicators of nutritional status (Godoy et al., 2006). (b)
In a previous study we found that Tsimane’ school-aged girls or
boys (5 years < age < 16 years) with an older sibling, particularly
an older brother, are less likely to enroll in school and complete
fewer grades of schooling (Zeng et al., 2012). We build on these
results for H3, aware that findings from the Tsimane’ might lack
external validity among neighboring ethnic groups.
3. Sample and study participants
The study took place in the Territorio Indígena Multiétnico
(TIM), department of Beni (Fig. 1). The area has 25 villages, but
one village did not have a school in 2012, so the educational CCT
program was not implemented in that village. We dropped this vil-
lage from the sample. Thus, we use 24 villages for the analyses.
Table 1 contains a summary of the number of villages, households,
individuals, and children included in the analysis.
A team with extensive experience doing household surveys
among Bolivian native Amazonians conducted the survey
(Leonard et al., 2015). The survey focused on household socioeco-
nomic conditions and was directed at household heads, but
included a demographic module with questions about the age,
sex, and school-grade attainment of all children in the household,
including whether each child had received a payment from the CCT
program the previous year.
The main form of subsistence in the area centers on slash-and-
burn cultivation, supplemented with fishing, hunting, plant collec-
tion, and wage labor in cattle ranches and logging camps. Our sur-
vey suggests that mean household monetary income per person
from the sale of goods and wage labor is US$1.04/day (median =
$0.17, SD = 2.1), but 39% of households in the sample earn no mon-
etary income (1 US$ = 7 bolivianos). Daily monetary income per
person varies between ethnic groups, from a low of US$0.50 among
the Tsimane’, to US$1.14 for Moxeños, to US$1.71 among the other
indigenous groups and non-indigenous lowlanders. 78% of the chil-
dren in our sample lived in extreme poverty (<US$1.25/person/day)
and 90% lived in poverty (<US$2.50/person/day). These figures
compare unfavorably with national averages for 2011. According
to Vargas and Garriga (2015), in 2011 7% of people in Bolivia lived
in extreme poverty and 16% lived in poverty (see also UDAPE, 2015,
p. 25).
During the study, six native Amazonian lowland groups inhab-
ited the area (Trinitario, Ignaciano, Moxeño, Tsimane’, Yuracaré,
Movima), in addition to indigenous highlanders (colla) and non-
indigenous lowlanders (camba) (Stearman, 1985). For the analysis,
we lump Trinitario, Ignaciano, and Moxeño under the rubric
Moxeño since they often use this term to refer to themselves as
a collective. The three groups have had long exposure to Jesuit mis-
sions and Westerners (Block, 1994), and in the late 19th century
and early 20th century they took part in the rubber boom as inden-
tured workers (Vallvé, 2010; van Valen, 2013) and in a millenarian
religious movement (Lehm Ardaya, 1999; Riester, 1976). Fluent in
Spanish, literate, and acculturated into the livestock culture of the
Jesuit missions, they soon became useful ranch-hands for Spanishcattle owners. Today, the Trinitarios, Ignacianos, and Moxeños
are among the most acculturated lowland groups.
We lump the Yuracaré and Movima and refer to them collec-
tively as a Lowland group. They too have had long exposure to out-
siders (the Yuracaré less so than the Movima), but neither group
has had as much exposure to outsiders as the Moxeño. Most Yur-
acaré and Movima are bilingual in their tongue and in Spanish
and are well-integrated into the market economy, often as ranch
hands (Thomas, 2012).
People from the lowlands use the term colla (sometimes pejora-
tively) to refer to highlanders of Aymara or Quechua stock
(Stearman, 1985). Highland-lowland economic and social relations
go back to pre-Hispanic days (Godoy, 2015), but the large influx of
highlanders into the territory of native Amazonians started during
the 1970s as the government set up colonization projects in the
lowlands to ease population pressure in the highlands (Jones,
1995). At present, collas in the lowlands play a prominent role in
transport and trade.
Last, the Tsimane’ have been extensively described in the
anthropological literature (e.g., Huanca, 2008; Reyes-García &
Huanca, 2015; Ringhofer, 2010) and form the group historically
least exposed to outsiders, although levels of exposure have
increased in recent decades (Reyes-García et al., 2014). In a world-
wide comparative study of 15 small-scale rural societies, the Tsi-
mane’ ranked next to last in market interactions, with only 7% of
total household calories bought in the market (Henrich et al.,
2010).4. Bolivia’s conditional cash transfer program for primary
education (Bono Juancito Pinto): A view from the lowlands
McGuire (2013) discusses the origins and development of Boli-
via’s educational CCT program, Bono Juancito Pinto, and elsewhere
we discuss how the educational system works in one of the groups
considered (Tsimane’) in a neighboring area (Godoy, Seyfried et al.,
2007; Reyes-Garcia et al., 2010; Undurraga et al., 2013), so in this
section we focus on how the CCT program works in the study area.
Bolivia’s educational system is officially divided into an obliga-
tory first stage and an optional second stage. The first stage covers
primary education and includes grades 1–8, broken down into
three parts: basic (grades 1–3), intermediate (grades 4–6), and
applied (grades 7–8). After primary education, children enter two
two-year cycles of high school education covering grades 9–10
and 11–12. In rural areas, grades 13–15 center on technical univer-
sity careers.
The 24 villages we analyze are in relatively inaccessible areas,
far from roads or towns (Table 2). Only seven villages were acces-
sible year-round by motorized vehicles in 2012. The typical school
has two teachers, at least one latrine, and a school committee that
had met at least once in the year before the survey. Most schools
have a breakfast program (92%) and multi-grade classrooms
(96%). Since villages are typically small (mean = 28 households/vil-
lage, SD = 19), teachers know first-hand their students and their
families. In most schools surveyed classes are taught only in the
morning. In larger villages and in grades 6–8, schools run in two
shifts, from 8am until noon, and from 2 pm until 6 pm; in those vil-
lages children attend only one of the two shifts. Thus, all children
have available time to help with farm and household chores when
not in school.
CCT payments are made at the end of each school year (Decem-
ber) by the Bolivian military, on behalf of the Ministry of Educa-
tion. Information about the exact dates is announced in schools
and via local radio stations. Payment days are festive occasions,
with parents and children arranging their schedule to ensure they
are present when the army arrives. The school principal shows the
Fig. 1. Map of the study area (Territorio Indígena Multiétnico, Dept. of Beni, Bolivia). Source: elaborated with cartographic data from Digital Chart of the World, GDAM and
GeoBolivia (ASTER GDEM) repositories. Digital Chart of the World: http://worldmap.harvard.edu/data/geonode:Digital_Chart_of_the_World. GDAM: http://www.gadm.org/.
GeoBolivia: http://geo.gob.bo/#map.
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with the obligation of attending at least 80% of school days. During
the school year, the village teacher can decide if an absence is legit-
imate (e.g., from illness), so children who miss more than 20% of
school days may still receive a payment. The army pays children,
unless parents step forward on behalf of their children. Even when
parents receive payments, they often hand the payment to theirchildren because they feel that children ‘‘[have] earned it”
(Zycherman, 2013, pp. 79–80). In our data, 60% of households
reported that the use of the payments was decided by ‘‘other (for
example, child)” – the questionnaire explicitly suggested children
as possible other deciders. Children are less likely to be deciders
in Tsimane’ households than in households of other ethnicities
(44% versus 60%-80%). If children or parents are absent, the school
Table 1
Sample of villages, households, and people used in the analysis.
Villages 24
Households 620
Individuals (all ages) 2922
Children 811
Children in the sample are 7 years  age16 years, attended primary school (grade
 8), and have non-missing data on CCT participation.
Table 2
Attributes of villages and schools as reported by village authorities (n = 24).
Attribute Mean SDa Median
A. Villages
Number of households in a village 28.0 18.6 20
Village accessible by motorized vehicles all year 29%
In dry season, hours walking from village to nearest
road
9.1 9.3 5
In dry season, hours walking from village to nearest
town
14.9 9.8 10
B. Schoolsb
Share of households in village with school-aged
children
59%
Number of registered school-age children in school 51 65 29
Share of households with school-age children that
do not send their children to school
13%
Age in years of village school 21 16 22.5
Maximum grade taught in village school 6.9 3.2 6
Number of teachers in school 4.2 4.9 2
Share of schools with multi-grade classrooms 96%
Number of children who study outside the village 5.9 8.3 2
Share of schools with a breakfast program 92%
Number of school latrines per school 1.3 1 1
Share of schools where school committee met this
year
92%
Share of villages with an adult educational program 17%
a SD = standard deviation.
b These variables were used in the principal component analysis to create the
index of school quality.
Table 3
Definition of variables used in regression analysis.
Variable Definition
A. Outcome as reported by parents
CCT Child received conditional cash transfer (CCT) payment as part
of the Bono Juancito Pinto program (1); 0 otherwise. Sample
includes only school-aged children (7 years  age16 years)
and primary school grades (grade  8)
B. Explanatory variables: Child attributes as reported by parents
Age Child’s age in years at the time of the survey
Girl Child’s sex: 1 = girl; 0 = boy
Schooling Maximum school grade completed [Not included in regressions]
C. Explanatory variables: Self-reported parental attributes
Ethnicity Dummy variables for the ethnic self-identification of parents:
Moxeño: 1 = both parents are Trinitario, Ignaciano, or
Moxeño; 0 otherwise
Tsimane’: 1 = both parents are Tsimane’; 0 otherwise
Lowland: 1 = both parents are Yuracaré or Movima; 0 other-
wise [excluded category in regressions]
Other: 1 = both parents are from the highlands (colla), cam-
ba/napo, or other; 0 otherwise [excluded category in
regressions]
Mixed: 1 = Mother and father do not share the same ethnic-
ity; 0 otherwise [excluded category in regressions]
Schooling Parental maximum school grade completed. Mother’s and
father’s schooling differs in 179 households; the mother had
more education in 89 households, and the father in 189
households
Spanish Parental Spanish fluency: 1 = either parent has moderate or
complete fluency in spoken Spanish as judged by surveyors; 0 =
both parents are monolingual in an Amazonian language
D. Explanatory variable: School characteristics as reported by village authorities
School
quality
Principal component factor analysis of the 12 attributes of
village schools listed in Table 2, Section B. Cronbach’s alpha =
0.83; Eigenvalue of first factor = 4.74
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form pledging to hand over the money to the student or parents
when they return to the village.5. Model and data
5.1. Model
To test our hypotheses, we relate receiving a payment from
Bono Juancito Pinto to several characteristics of the households,
the parents, and the children, controlling for school quality. Our
sample includes 811 children meeting the sample inclusion criteria
described below and for whom we have information on whether
they received payment from the CCT program the year before the
survey. Our primary regression equation is:
CCTihv ¼ aþ b  Ehv þ h  Phv þ c  Cihv þ d  Sv þ eihv: ð1Þ
In Eq. (1) i, h, and v index children, households, and villages, CCT
is a binary variable equal to one if child i received the CCT the pre-
vious school year, E is a vector of binary indicators of the house-
hold’s ethnicity, P is a vector of parental modern human capital
indicators, C is a vector of children’s characteristics, S is an index
of school characteristics, and e indicates the error term. In one
regression, we also include village fixed effects to show that our
conclusions persist after controlling for village characteristics
beyond those directly pertaining to school quality. Table 3 contains
definition of these variables. We estimate the parameters of Eq. (1)using probit regressions, with standard errors clustered by house-
hold. In the main tables we show average marginal effects, but in
the tables of the Appendix we show probit coefficients for models
that include interaction terms.5.2. Sample
For the main analysis we restrict the sample in two ways. First,
we analyze data only from children 7 years  age  16 years. Chil-
dren typically enter school at age six; our survey asks about receiv-
ing the CCT payment the previous year, so we analyze children
who were seven years and older in 2012. Sixteen is the age at
which Tsimane’ children typically marry and form new house-
holds; this age might not apply to children from other ethnic
groups, but applying it uniformly standardizes our analysis. Later
we perform sensitivity analysis to see if results change when we
raise the top age. Second, we drop children whose education level
is higher than grade nine; we fielded the survey in 2012 and asked
about receiving a transfer from the CCT program the year before, so
we include all children who were in grades covered by the program
that year. We assume that no child in our sample repeated the
ninth grade, which we cannot verify with our data. Forty children
meet our sample inclusion criteria but had missing information on
whether they received the transfer so they are not included in the
analysis. These children are from households that speak less Span-
ish, are older, and are more likely to be girls than the 811 children
in our final sample.5.3. Summary statistics
Table 4 provides summary statistics on the full sample, disag-
gregated by participation in the CCT program. The average age of
Table 4
Summary statistics by CCT program participation.
Total
(n = 811)
Received CCT
(n = 695)
Did not receive CCT
(n = 116)
p-value from t tests
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
A. Child
Age 11 2.6 11 2.4 11 3.3 0.138
Girl (%) 47 48 41 0.223
Schooling (grades) 3.9 2.4 4.1 2.2 2.9 2.7 <0.001
B. Mother
Ethnicity (%)
Moxeño 77 81 56 <0.001
Tsimane’ 14 10 35 <0.001
Lowland 5 6 1 0.027
Other 4 4 8 0.042
Schooling (grades) 3.8 3.4 4.0 3.3 2.8 3.5 0.001
Speaks Spanish (%) 81 85 58 <0.001
C. Father
Ethnicity (%)
Moxeño 74 77 54 <0.001
Tsimane’ 13 10 35 <0.001
Lowland 8 8 6 0.504
Other 5 5 5 0.935
Schooling (grades) 4.6 3.8 4.8 3.7 3.6 3.8 0.006
Speaks Spanish (%) 82 85 63 <0.001
Village school quality
Children attending school in top
50% of school quality (%)
77 42 81 39 51 50 <0.001
Table shows means and standard deviations (SD) by whether child in primary school (grades  8; 7 years  age  16 years) received the CCT educational payment from Bono
Juancito Pinto in 2011. For definitions of variables see Table 3. Numbers of observations are lower than 811 for mothers’ and fathers’ characteristics due to missing values. P
values are from t-tests of the difference in means between children receiving and not receiving the CCT. The village-level village school quality index has a mean of 0 and a
standard deviation of 1 by construction; the index values range from 1.21 to 3.56.
6 J. Bauchet et al. /World Development 105 (2018) 1–12children in the sample is 11 years. In the regressions we include
both age and age squared because the relation between CCT partic-
ipation and age is non-linear: participation increases for children
up to age 13 and decreases for older children (Appendix Fig. 1;
the predicted participation rate from the regressions increases up
to age 11). The sample is almost evenly split between girls (47%)
and boys (53%). On average, children completed 3.9 grades of
school, but children who did not participate completed fewer
grades (2.9) than children who did participate (4.1; p < .001). The
gap between participants and non-participants is wider for
younger children than older children. This age pattern implies that,
unlike PROGRESA/Oportunidades in Mexico where little impact on
enrollment was found for younger children because enrollment
rates were already high (Behrman et al., 2005; Parker & Todd,
2017; Schultz, 2004), the Bolivian educational CCT program can
be expected to have large impact on enrollment, attendance, and
grade progression.
Parental characteristics include parents’ ethnicity, maximum
school grade completed, and Spanish-speaking ability. 77% of
mothers and 74% of fathers are Moxeño, about 13% of both mothers
and fathers are Tsimane’, and the remainder are lowlanders or peo-
ple from other ethnic groups described above. In the regression
analyses the binary variables indicating households’ ethnicity are
equal to one if both parents are of the same ethnicity and zero
otherwise; 86% of couples are of the same ethnicity. Mixed-
ethnicity couples are indicated by a separate binary variable. 70%
of all children are fromMoxeño households, 13% are from Tsimane’
households, 13% are from mixed-ethnicity households, and the
remainder have parents from other ethnic groups. Parents have
on average only completed about half of the primary school grades.
Mothers completed 3.8 grades of schooling, and fathers completed
4.6 grades. About 80% of both parents speak Spanish, although par-
ents of children receiving a transfer were statistically significantly
more likely to speak Spanish.In the regressions we control for school quality, measured by an
index that we created. The index of school quality is a Z-score from
the principal component factor analysis of 12 attributes of village
schools, described in Table 3. Table 4 shows that children who do
not receive the payment live in villages with schools of lower qual-
ity than children who receive the payment. Only 51% of those who
do not receive a payment live in a school ranked in the top half of
quality, according to our index, against 81% of those who receive a
payment.
5.4. Comparison of summary statistics by ethnic group
In Table 5 we compare characteristics of children, parents, and
villages by ethnic group. Several messages arise from the table.
First, rates of participation in the CCT program are lower for Tsi-
mane’ children than for children of all other ethnic groups. 62%
of Tsimane’ children received a payment from the CCT program,
but 83% to 94% of children of other ethnic group received the
payment.
Second, both Tsimane’ children and adults have lower schooling
and fluency speaking Spanish than members of other ethnic
groups, or than people from mixed-ethnicity households. For
example, Tsimane’ children have completed 1.7 school grades,
but children of other ethnic groups have completed 3.7 to 4.9
school grades. Perhaps the most striking difference between Tsi-
mane’ and other ethnic groups is in the Spanish-speaking ability
of mothers: only 3% of Tsimane’ mothers speak some or fluent
Spanish, versus 89% to 100% of mothers from other ethnic groups.
Finally, Table 5 shows that – compared with children in other
groups – Tsimane’ children live in smaller, more remote villages
than children of other ethnic groups. Tsimane’ children live in vil-
lages with about 18 households, located 21 hours on foot from the
nearest town. Only 3% of villages are accessible year-round. Tsi-
mane’ children also attend lower-quality schools. Our index of
Table 5
Summary statistics, by parents’ ethnicity.
Couple’s ethnicity: Tsimane’ Moxeño Lowland Other Mixed
N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean
A. Child
Received CCT (%) 90 62 502 90 17 94 12 83 89 88
Age 90 10 502 11 17 12 12 11 89 11
Girl (%) 90 47 502 48 17 41 12 58 89 52
Schooling (grades) 90 1.7 502 4.3 17 4.9 12 4.7 89 3.7
B. Mother
Schooling (grades) 89 0.4 491 4.4 15 3.3 12 2.8 89 3.8
Speaks Spanish (%) 89 3 491 93 15 100 12 100 89 89
C. Father
Schooling (grades) 87 0.9 451 5.2 17 4.3 12 6.2 80 4.9
Speaks Spanish (%) 87 10 451 93 17 100 12 100 80 93
D. Villages
Number of households 90 18 502 44 17 36 12 54 89 39
Accessible all year (%) 90 3 502 43 17 65 12 58 89 52
Hours walking from village to nearest town 89 21 341 12 17 8 10 11 80 10
Children attending school in top 50% of school quality (%) 90 3 502 89 17 65 12 83 89 73
Table shows variables used in main regression analysis, by parents’ ethnicity. For definition of variables see Table 3. Statistical tests of the differences in means across ethnic
groups (ANOVA for continuous variables or chi-squared tests for categorical variables) are all significant at the 1% level. The village-level school quality index has a mean of 0
and a standard deviation of 1 by construction; the index values range from –1.21 to 3.56.
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various ethnicities. Tsimane’ children are the least likely to live
in a village in which the school is in the top 50% of our quality
index (3%), whereas 65% to 89% of children of other ethnic groups
live in villages in which the school is in the top 50% of our quality
index.5.5. Multicollinearity
The relation between ethnicity, schooling and Spanish fluency
suggest that our regressions, which include all these variables,
could suffer from multicollinearity. Indeed, we show in Appendix
Table 1 that some of the variables included in our regressions are
strongly correlated with each other. Multicollinearity does not
appear to affect our results, however, since variance inflation fac-
tors (VIFs) for variables in our main regressions are lower than
10, used as a rule of thumb to detect problematic multicollinear-
ity (Hair, 2010; Kutner, 2004), in nearly all our regressions
(Appendix Table 2). In addition, our estimated coefficients for
variables other than parental modern human capital do not
change if either or both of the variables for parental modern
human capital (schooling and fluency speaking Spanish) are omit-
ted (Appendix Table 3).
VIFs for age and age squared are high, because these are natu-
rally highly correlated, but drop to 4.14 or below if age squared
is not included in the regressions. In regressions including binary
variables controlling for the village in which children live (Table 6,
column 5), the VIFs for the school quality index are high (about 73)
because there is typically only one school per village. This result is
not worrisome because regression coefficients in Table 6, column
5, are similar in magnitude, sign, and statistical significance to
the other coefficients without the full set of village binary
variables.6. Main regression results
The results are presented in Table 6, with variables grouped by
hypotheses.6.1. H1: Ethnic attributes
Our main test of the first hypothesis is reported in column 1 of
Table 6. It shows support for the hypothesis that ethnicity is a pre-
dictor of participation in the CCT program for primary school atten-
dance. Being a child in a household in which both parents are
Tsimane’, the least-acculturated ethnic group, is associated with
a large and statistically significantly lower probability of receiving
a CCT payment, relative to all other ethnic groups. Children of Tsi-
mane’ couples are 20 percentage points less likely to receive the
educational cash transfer (p < .001). The size of coefficients varies
in other regressions, but is always above 17 percentage points
and statistically significant at the 5% level. On the other hand, chil-
dren of Moxeño households, a group that has historically had more
contact with mainstream Bolivian culture, are statistically equally
likely to receive a CCT payment than lowlanders and ‘‘other” ethnic
groups.
We probe further into the relation between CCT participation
and ethnicity in two ways. First, we analyze the ethnicity of each
parent separately (Appendix Table 4, columns 1 and 2). We find
that the main result is driven by the ethnicity of the father. Having
a Tsimane’ father is associated with a 17 percentage points lower
probability of receiving an educational CCT payment (p = .002).
The coefficient of the variable for Tsimane’ mothers is negative
but not statistically significant at the 5% level (p = .083). Second,
to assess if there are interaction effects between ethnicity and
the other explanatory variables, we interact the variable indicating
that parents are Tsimane’ with all the other explanatory variables
(Appendix Table 4, column 3). The results show that there are
interaction effects between a child’s age and having Tsimane’ par-
ents, but there are no significant interaction effects between eth-
nicity and other characteristics, such as parents’ modern human
capital, child sex, and village school quality. Because understand-
ing the interaction of the Tsimane’ binary variable, age and age
squared is not intuitive from the regression, we plotted the relation
between ethnicity, age, and predicted likelihood of participating in
the CCT program in Appendix Fig. 2. Appendix Fig. 2 shows that age
and participation in the program are non-linearly associated for
both Tsimane’ children and children of other ethnicities, and that
participation rates are lower for Tsimane’ children at almost all
ages.
Table 6
Correlates of child participation in CCT program of primary-school attendance.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable: 1 if child received payment from CCT program; 0 otherwise
H1: Ethnic attributes – Household ethnicity
Parents are both Tsimane’ 0.200*** 0.216*** 0.177*** 0.216*** 0.175**
(0.056) (0.052) (0.060) (0.054) (0.079)
Parents are both Moxeño 0.020
(0.035)
H2: Parental modern human capital
Max. schooling of parents 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.001
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Max. Spanish fluency of parents 0.026 0.026 0.001 0.094*
(0.053) (0.052) (0.056) (0.053)
Mother: Schooling 0.008
(0.006)
Mother: Speaks Spanish 0.018
(0.094)
Father: Schooling 0.005
(0.005)
Father: Speaks Spanish 0.021
(0.101)
H3: Child attributes
Age (years) 0.279*** 0.280*** 0.280*** 0.269*** 0.286***
(0.035) (0.035) (0.038) (0.035) (0.035)
Age squared 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.013***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Girl 0.020 0.020 0.018 0.017 0.018
(0.021) (0.021) (0.023) (0.021) (0.021)
Number of older brothers (16y) 0.030**
(0.014)
Number of younger brothers (16y) 0.008
(0.013)
Number of older sisters (16y) 0.016
(0.018)
Number of younger sisters (16y) 0.019
(0.013)
Village school quality
School quality index 0.012 0.013 0.009 0.014 0.036
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.081)
Observations 710 710 633 710 694
Village fixed effects included No No No No Yes
Chi-square test for parental human capital marginal effect coefficients jointly = 0
Chi-square statistic: 0.42 0.43 2.37 3.26
p > Chi-square: 0.811 0.809 0.668 0.196
Chi-square test for sibling marginal effect coefficients jointly = 0
Chi-square statistic: 9.58
p > Chi-square: 0.048
Coefficients are average marginal effects of probit regressions. Standard errors clustered by household in parentheses. *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .10. Definitions are provided in
Table 3. In column 1, the omitted ethnicities are lowland, other ethnic group, and mixed (mother and father of different ethnicities).
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speaking Spanish
6.2.1. Schooling
Columns 1–3 of Table 6 contain the main results of the test of
H2 on the relation between parental maximum schooling and chil-
dren’s participation in the CCT program. Parental maximum
schooling is defined as the maximum grade attainment for the
two parents (Table 3). These results do not confirm our second
hypothesis. The regression coefficients are small and not statisti-
cally significant, neither when considering parents’ maximum
schooling grade (column 2) nor when accounting for each parent’s
schooling separately (column 3). Controlling for the number of
children in the household (column 4) or for village fixed effects
also barely changes the coefficients from columns 1–2. Estimating
the model with mothers’ modern human capital and fathers’ mod-
ern human capital also does not change the sign or the statistical
significance of any coefficient (Appendix Table 5). These results
show that parental schooling of mothers or fathers (conditioningon Spanish speaking language skills) does not affect the probability
of receiving a CCT payment.
6.2.2. Spanish
With one exception, we find that the maximum parental flu-
ency in spoken Spanish is not an important predictors of a child
participating in the CCT program. Maximum parental fluency is
determined by the parent with the highest fluency level (Table 3).
The coefficients of columns 1–2 and 4 suggest that having a parent
who is fluent or nearly fluent in Spanish does not change the prob-
ability of a child participating in the CCT program. The results of
the regression in column 5, which controls for village fixed effects,
suggest that having a parent who is fluent or moderately fluent in
Spanish may be associated with an increase in the likelihood that
the child will participates in a CCT program, but the coefficient is
only statistically significant at the 10% level (p = .079). The corre-
sponding coefficients in other models are not statistically signifi-
cant, calling for caution in giving too much weight to this result.
Column 3 and Appendix Table 5 show that when we include vari-
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those results are still not statistically significant.
6.2.3. Joint significance of both modern human capital variables
Chi-square tests of the joint significance of the variables for
schooling and Spanish-speaking ability, in Table 6 and in Appendix
Table 5, show that the two variables together were not significant
predictors of CCT participation. In sum, we find no evidence that
the level of modern human capital of parents predicts whether a
child receives the CCT transfer.
6.3. H3. Child attributes.
Evidence for our third hypothesis is presented in Table 6, col-
umns 1 and 4. As hypothesized, we do not find evidence of gender
disparity in participation in the CCT programs. The point estimates
suggest that girls are about 2 percentage points less likely to par-
ticipate in the CCT program than boys, but results are not statisti-
cally significant (p = .338 and p = .411, columns 1 and 4).
Our hypothesis that participation increases with age is partially
confirmed. Regression coefficients indicate that age is statistically
significantly and non-linearly associated with participation in the
CCT program. Dividing the negative of the coefficient for the linear
term by twice the coefficient for the squared term suggests that
participation increases with age up until the age of about 11 years,
then decreases after that (averages in the raw data, shown in
Appendix Fig. 1, place peak participation rate at 13 years).
We re-estimate the regression in column 1 with a series of vari-
ables indicating the number of older brothers, older sisters,
younger brothers, and younger sisters of each child (Table 6, col-
umn 4). We do this because, as noted earlier, previous research
among the Tsimane’ suggests that the sibling composition of the
household predicts child educational attainment (Zeng et al.,
2012). We find that the sibling composition of the household pre-
dicts participation, as evidenced by the statistically significant Chi-
square test (v2 = 9.58, p = .048). Specifically, the number of older
brothers is a statistically significant predictor of participation in
the CCT program, although the size of the relation is small, whereas
the numbers of older sisters or younger siblings of both sexes are
not. The coefficient estimate indicates that each additional older
brother is associated with a 3 percentage points lower probability
of receiving a CCT payment (p = .033), consistent with (Zeng et al.,
2012). However, the average number of older brothers of children
in our sample is only 0.5 (SD = 0.8), or 1.3 conditional on having an
older brother, so in practice an average child with an older brother
would in fact only be 3.9 percentage points less likely to participate
in a CCT program.
6.4. Robustness test
To test the robustness of our findings, we use village fixed
effects to control for village characteristics that may predict chil-
dren’s participation in CCT programs and correlate with the covari-
ates of interest (distinct from the schools’ characteristics included
in the index of school quality). Some of these characteristics could
include distance from villages to the nearby town, or village ethnic
mix. Coefficient estimates from this regression are presented in
Table 6, column 5. These results largely confirm our main findings.
For example, after including village fixed effects, having Tsimane’
parents is associated with a 17.5 percentage points lower probabil-
ity of receiving a CCT payment (p = .027). In this model, most par-
ental and child characteristics also remain not statistically
significant predictors of CCT participation, and age has the same
nonlinear relation with participation. As in the previous regres-
sions, school quality does not predict participation after controlling
for other village characteristics.7. Discussion of possible mechanisms for the findings
The Tsimane’ are the least acculturated of the ethnic groups in
our sample; the significantly lower level of participation in the
CCT program by Tsimane’ children, even after controlling for par-
ental schooling and fluency in spoken Spanish and for school char-
acteristics, suggests that the program does not fully redress
inequalities in access to services that aim to be universal. We
explore several mechanisms that could explain why Tsimane’ chil-
dren have lower participation rates in the CCT program.
7.1. Program awareness
Raising awareness has been shown to increase participation in
government programs in Latin America (Brandt, 2012; Larrañaga,
Contreras, & Ruiz-Tagle, 2012). Among the population we study,
Reyes-García, Vadez, Aragon, Huanca, and Jagger (2010) show that
the Tsimane’ have limited awareness of the Bolivian government’s
decentralization reform, so one could argue that low awareness
also explains Tsimane’ lower participation in the CCT program.
This interpretation has two main problems. First, awareness of
the CCT program is likely to be higher than awareness of decentral-
ization because CCT program pay families directly, and payment
days are widely announced and result in salient festive occasions
in villages (Zycherman, 2013). Second, villages in which Tsimane’
children live are smaller than villages in which children of other
ethnic groups live. Living in smaller villages should make it easier
for the school teacher to communicate the existence of the pro-
gram and the schedule of payments within the village.
7.2. Limited parental modern human capital
Even if they are aware of the program, Tsimane’ parents, having
limited ability to speak Spanish, could be hampered in their ability
to interact with the school teacher(s), or with the military on pay-
ment days. In Mexico, de Janvry and Sadoulet (2006) found that
indigenous parents’ literacy predicted their children’s participation
in the CCT for primary school. However, our results show that this
mechanism is likely not at play in Bolivia. The maximum school
grade attainment or the ability to speak Spanish fluently of either
parent or of both parents combined never predicted the participa-
tion of the child in the CCT program. Even if parents lack the mod-
ern human capital skills and comfort to communicate directly with
teachers and the military, others in the village can inform
unschooled parents of the program.
7.3. Within-village costs of reaching school
Since each village in our dataset has a school and payments are
made in the village, the relevant transportation costs are within-
village costs. Within a village, some children may face higher costs
of reaching the school. Although villages are nucleated, not all
households have the same physical access to the village school.
Being less acculturated than other ethnic groups, Tsimane’ house-
holds may prefer living farther away from village centers, creating
physical difficulties for their children to attend school and meet the
program’s conditions. During most of the year, household-to-
school distance is not a hurdle to school attendance, but during
the rainy season when CCT payments happen, children who live
far from school may find it harder to attend school because they
cannot cross growing bodies of water. The smaller size of villages
in which Tsimane’ children live (18 households/village on average,
versus 36–54 households/village for children of other ethnicities;
Table 5), however, again casts doubts on the effect of within-
village transportation costs on school enrollment and CCT program
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idence of each household within the village, house-to-school dis-
tance, travel time, or seasonal water barriers, so we cannot test
this hypothesis empirically.
7.4. Culture and trust
Participation of Tsimane’ children could be affected by their
own or their parents’ ability to interact with, cultural norms
towards, or trust in government officials or outsiders to their com-
munities. This mechanism is unlikely to interfere with the families’
ability to receive the payment, for two reasons: (i) the government
officials most directly involved in administering the program and
the payments at the village level are the school teachers, who are
well known by and familiar to village inhabitants, and (ii) most Tsi-
mane’ interactions with outsiders are non–hostile and welcoming,
with the largest rejection corresponding to highland colonist farm-
ers entering Tsimane’ territory (Reyes-García et al., 2012).
7.5. Utility of formal schooling
Because the Tsimane’ are more autarkic than the other groups,
they might not derive as much utility from formal schooling. For
example, Tsimane’ adults (>16 years) were 23% less likely than
adults from other groups to earn any monetary income from wage
labor or from the sale of farm goods. Because they are highly autar-
kic, they rely more on traditional forms of human capital for their
livelihood and health, such as local ecological knowledge, and thus
place less stress on formal schooling for their children (McDade
et al., 2007; Reyes-García, 2015). Some evidence suggests that
learning local ecological knowledge is not always compatible with
investments in schooling (Reyes-García et al., 2007). The Tsimane’
also actively practice endogamy with respect to their ethnic group
(Patel et al., 2007), which means that (i) Tsimane’ are less likely to
connect with national society through marriage, and (ii) Tsimane’
society is tightly knit with very little market-oriented interactions
within villages. For example, there are no shops in Tsimane’ vil-
lages, and locally-produced goods are more commonly bartered
than sold (Undurraga, Zycherman, Yiu, & Godoy, 2014).
Lower returns to schooling do not imply that modern forms of
human capital have no benefits for the Tsimane’. Studies have
shown that schooling, fluency in Spanish, and math skills correlate
positively with better market outcomes for the Tsimane’ (Godoy,
Reyes-García, et al., 2007; Godoy, Seyfried, et al., 2007;
Undurraga et al., 2013). As we have documented above, however,
modern human capital provides small benefits within villages or
among the Tsimane’, so the returns to education are primarily lim-
ited to interactions outside the Tsimane’ culture or at least outside
their villages. It is possible that the monetary cash transfer
unlocked by children attending school and the limited benefits of
schooling are not worth the opportunity cost of children attending
school.
8. Conclusion
We estimate predictors of participation in a conditional cash
transfer program in Bolivia which tries to increase child enrollment
in primary school. Understanding participation matters because it
can help improve the program and broaden its reach. Worryingly,
our findings based on 811 school-aged children in rural areas in the
Bolivian Amazon indicate that the most marginalized, least-
acculturated, group (Tsimane’) is less likely to participate in an
educational CCT program whose mission is, precisely, to increase
enrollment. In the entire sample, children who did not participate
in the program completed 30% fewer grades of schooling than chil-dren who participated, with a more pronounced effect for younger
children. The most likely mechanism at play is that returns to for-
mal schooling are lower for the Tsimane’ due to their autarkic, self-
sufficient livelihoods.
Our findings raise the question of how to increase participation
rates in CCT programs among ethnic groups least exposed to
national society. We suggest three ways to increase participation.
One is to increase the amount of the transfer, possibly combined
with differentiated payments for different participants. The annual
payment in Bolivia has been fixed at US$28 per child and has not
changed since the program started. McGuire (2013) argues that
the level is too low, as it fails to compensate households for the
opportunity cost of their children going to school and other costs
to participating. However, small transfers have been shown in
other educational CCT programs to have large impacts (Kremer,
Brannen, & Glennerster, 2013), which implies that even a small
payment might incentivize participation. Higher payments may
also not be feasible in limited national budgets. Differentiating
payments by characteristics of the participants might be a work-
able solution to this problem (Dayioglu, Murat, & Aysit, 2009),
although the evidence that differential payments increase partici-
pation is unclear (Baird et al., 2011; Filmer & Schady, 2011;
Kremer et al., 2013). Finally, making school curricula more relevant
for lowland indigenous children would increase the returns to
schooling for these populations, could incentivize enrollment and
attendance, and by consequence could increase participation in
the program.
Another possible way to increase participation is to relax condi-
tionality in the program. Relaxing conditionality can increase par-
ticipation by reducing the burden of complying with conditions
(Cookson, 2016; Ma et al., 2017). For example, relaxing condition-
ality may incentivize children to attend school at least some of the
time. The traditional concern with removing conditionality is that
it might decrease the effectiveness of the program, but evidence
from randomized controlled trials and meta-analyses suggest that
the impacts of unconditional cash transfer programs in education
and in other sectors are positive (Benhassine, Devoto, Duflo,
Dupas, & Pouliquen, 2015; Haushofer & Shapiro, 2016), and not
statistically significantly lower than those of conditional cash
transfer programs (Baird et al., 2014; Manley, Gitter, &
Slavchevska, 2013).
Conditional cash transfer programs have generally proven effec-
tive at increasing primary-school enrollment and attendance
among low-income groups. These programs may have long-
lasting effects on children and their households. But our findings
indicate that reaching the most marginalized, disadvantaged eth-
nic minorities may require additional efforts at reducing barriers
to participation.
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